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Springer's Supreme Court Petition, Part VI, Loan, Gift, Income
Lindsey Springer and Oscar Stilley are political prisoners serving 15 year sentences for "tax crimes." I urge you to support them both spiritually and financially. An address for donations appears at the end of this post.
XII. THE PANEL REFUSES TO REVERSE COUNT FOUR THOUGH THE ENTIRE THEORY OF LIABILITY IS BASED UPON A "LOAN"
"[t]he standard...of gross income...excludes loans." James v. U.S., 366 U.S. 213, 219-20(1961). "[a] loan agreed to be repaid does not constitute gross income." U.S. v. Swallow, 511 F.2d 514, 523 (10th Cir. 1975). "[g]ross income" does not extend to "economic gain...otherwise exempt." CIR v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 433 (2004). Besides the Court defining "gift" in violation of several due process rights, the Court allowed the Jury to consider a "loan" in August, 2005, as "gross income" for 2005. App. K-10. Turner testified this was wrong. App. I-9
Count Four involves a $ 250,000.00 loan to buy an RV then worth twice the purchase price before the economy tanked. Both the loan and purchase of the RV were made within a few days of each other. App. I-3. Mr. Turner held the only secured lien interest in the RV. App. I-12. Petitioner made $ 1400.00 payments for almost three years before he became so devastated by the Prosecution's investigation. His ministry supporters, after being called before numerous grand juries, ceased their support for fear of further harassment. After trial Turner repossessed the RV as Petitioner was unable to sell the RV or commit to make any further payments.
The theory of Count Four is entirely not a tax evasion crime in 2005. Even if the loan became "gross income" (and it never did) when Petitioner ceased making payments, that occurred in late 2008, not in 2005. App. K-11. The Court allowed the expert to testify he believed the loan should be treated as "gross income". App. K-10. The first time Petitioner ever even heard that anyone thought a secured loan was gross income was during trial. Petitioner was not aware of the Prosecution's theory nor were they. App. K-10
XIII. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO DENY DISMISSAL BASED UPON DETERMINATION MONEY GIVEN PETITIONER WAS OR WAS NOT "GIFTS" HAD NOT YET BEEN MADE, RESULTING IN FACT FINDER DETERMINING BOTH THE ISSUE OF GIFT AND TAX LIABILITY, CONFLICTS WITH CIR V. DUBERSTEIN.
The 16th Amendment explains Congress' power to lay and collect a tax on income from whatever source derived. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.Co., 240 U.S. 1, 17 (1916). Congress excluded from the calculation of "gross income" all gifts. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284 (1960). Duberstein held "Gift" is not used in Section 102 in the "common law sense" but rather in the "colloquial sense." Id. at 284-85. The SOTT has not defined "Gift" under his rule making authority. There is no question gifts over a certain amount are taxed by the SOTT to the donor.
Petitioner was tried by Jury in this criminal tax case. Petitioner moved to dismiss each Count based upon this Court's holding in Duberstein that the Court was not "to allow trial of the issues whether receipt of a specific payment is a gift to turn into a trial on the tax liability." Id. at 289. App. OO-7 The Prosecution opposed, asserting the Jury could determine both gift and liability. App. OO-7. At trial, the Prosecution focused on "donor" intent and in every case the person who gave Petitioner money had not filed any gift return. The Court explained to the Jury (App. M-7):
"In determining whether payment of money or property to the Defendant is non-taxable gift, you should consider the intent of the parties at the time the payment is made. In determining whether a transfer of money is a 'gift' for tax purposes, the question is whether in actuality the transfer is a bona fide gift or simply a method for paying compensation for services."
Petitioner objected to the Court's entire instruction on "Gift" and "minister's income" as they were not derived from the law. Petitioner demonstrated that "Compensation for Services" was defined at 26 CFR 1.61-2(2000-2012) to be "on the basis of a percentage of profits." App. U-12 After defining "willfulness" and "good faith":
"you are instructed that if a defendant had a good faith misunderstanding of the laws requirement to report income at issue here...you will be guided by the rules set forth in the next two instructions." App. M-4
The Bill of Particulars identified Sections 61 ("gross income") and 63 ("taxable income"). Taxable income is defined to mean "gross income minus deductions and exemptions." App. U-2 The Trial Court went against Duberstein and instructed the jury on its "maxims of experience." Duberstein held "Gift" "had no principals of law but rather maxims of experience." Any determination of a tax deficiency or duty to make and then file a tax return at issue in all six Counts turns on the meaning of "Gift" at Section 102. This Court recently held "[T]here is no criminal evasion without a tax deficiency." Boulware v. U.S. 170 L.Ed. 2d 34, 40-41(2008).
To further frustrate Petitioner, Count One alleged Petitioner "told [IRS] employees [3 months after June 3, 2005 referral for 2000 through 2004 only] that all funds he received are gifts and donations, that he does not have any income and...does not provide any services for payment." App. JJ-4. Special Agent Shern did not remember whether Petitioner actually said "any gross income." App. L-10. The Court defining "Gift" and "minister income" in its "maxim of experience" deprived Petitioner of a Jury Trial on their maxim of experience as this Court in Duberstein held was the Fact Finder's role.
The Court equally ignored Duberstein's directive not to allow trial of gift transactions to turn into a trial on tax liability stemming from those transactions. The Court also used the term "gross income" interchangeably with "income" instructing the Jury gifts or income. Section 102 makes "Gifts" excluded from "gross income." In fact, of the Court's entire instruction on "Gift" Petitioner had no prior notice. The Jury could not find Petitioner was aware of the Court's definition at the times the "Gifts" were transacted.
Petitioner's "maxim of experience" was no better on display than in three events. First, SEC v. TIGC, et al., 212 F.3d 180, 185-86(2000); Cert Denied 532 U.S. 905(2001) where the United States confiscated $ 1.265 million in donations based upon claim Bondage Breaker's Ministries and Petitioner gave no "consideration." See 993 F. Supp. 324, 325-26(E.D. PA 1998). Second, Petitioner's experience with the Supreme Court's "In Forma Pauperis Application" clearly considers "Gifts" as "income" not excluded from it. App. SS-2. The Third event is reading Section 102 and Duberstein. Everything including "Gifts" are money coming in. The question is not whether the money was "income" but rather "gross income." Making "Gifts" excluded from "income" to the jury violates so many aspects of due process and Petitioner's right to a Sixth Amendment Jury Trial the verdict is just unreliable.
Even where every second of time Petitioner spent with each donor was a "service" the donations sometimes in the Tens of Thousands of dollars exceeded the value of the (undefined) services which could be measured as pennies on the dollar. Many Circuits have made the mistake of "Gift or income". Lane v. U.S., 286 F.3d 723, 728 (4th Cir. 2002); Potito v. CIR, 534 F.2d 49, 52(5th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125, 1134(7th Cir. 1991); Woody v. U.S., 386 F.2d 658(9th Cir. 1966). The District Court and now Panel "abused their discretion by making an error of law." Koon v. U.S., 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996).
The Panel explained "the Court gave the Jury the task of determining whether any transfers were gifts or income." App. A-1. The Panel ignored Duberstein, citing to U.S. v. Kasynski, 284 F.2d 143, 145 (10th Cir. 1960) which was a refund case and not a criminal tax case. All "Gifts" are "income" but excluded from "gross income". The Trial Court held "income" and gross and taxable income "terms of art." Appp. K-3
XIV DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION FOR YEARS IN RESTITUTION AND IT WAS UNREASONABLE FOR THE COURT TO USE CIVIL CONDUCT FOR 2T1.1.
The Panel refused to hold the Judgment solely based upon "relevant criminal conduct". See USSG SEc. 2T1.1(2005). The "referral" was limited to tax years "2000 through 2004". App. BB-1 The Trial Court derived its "Tax Loss" from 1990 through 2007, and from Stilley's proposed tax liabilities, which were not at issue in the referral. App. Q-2. The Trial Court though held they were. App. O-7. Section 2T1.1 "only permits consideration of 'relevant criminal conduct' underlying the charged offense." U.S. v. Meek, 998 F.2d 776, 781 (10th Cir. 1993). The "relevant conduct" must be criminal not merely civil. U.S. v. Daniels, 998 F.2d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 1992). The Court should have dismissed Counts One and Four, and limited its "relevant criminal conduct" to 2000 and 2003 regarding "Tax Loss" as no charge existed for 2001, and 2002 and 2004 were for failure to file only. The Court's restitution order exceed its jurisdiction.
XV. TOUGHY REGULATIONS DO NOT OVERRIDE THE SIXTH AMENDMENT.
Agent Meadors who violated LaSalle's rule in 2004 closed her "investigation" thanking Petitioner for his cooperation. App. Z-1. Petitioner proceeded in forma pauperis causing the Trial witnesses to be subpoenaed at Government expense. The Trial Court refused to issue a subpoena for Meadors asserting Petitioner had not complied with "Touhy" regulations. App. O-12 This Court explained in U.S. v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 467 (1951) it was not addressing "refusal to produce in a prosecution by the United States." All Petitioner need show is Meador's testimony would have favored his defense. U.S. v. Guild, 341 F. Appx. 879, 886 (4th Cir. 2009); see Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). Meadors not testifying was simply "unconscionable". Jenks v. U.S. 353 U.S. 657, 671 (1957). The Panel disagreed. App. A-13; L-6 to L-9
Thank you so much for the support you have given us so far. I pray that you are rewarded for your generosity, both in this life and the next.
PayPal: gnutella at mindspring.com
Mailing address for donations or other inquiries (cash, or blank first name on checks): _________ Springer 5147 S. Harvard, #116, Tulsa, OK 74135
Letters to Lindsey directly (no donations or packages): Lindsey Springer, 02580-063 FCI Big Spring 1900 Simler Ave Big Spring, TX 79720
Thanks, Lindsey & Family